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Environmental constitutionalism is a relatively recent phenomenon at the 
confluence of constitutional law, international law, human rights, and environmental  
law. It embodies the recognition that the environment is a proper subject for 
protection in the constitutional texts and for vindication by constitutional 
courts worldwide.4 This chapter posits ten “good practices” – those attributes 
1 ���� ������� ��� ��������� �� ��� ������� � ������ �� ����� ������������ ���������� ������
������������� � ����������������. ���. CRUZ� P���� Má����; GARCIA� H������ S�q�����; 
GUASQU�� Bá�����. Av������� ��� �����//������.�j��.j��.��/����/952������������������
����������������������������������������������������. 
2 P��f����� �f L�� �� W������ U��v�����y
3 I�����  D��� ��� P��f����� �f L�� �� W������ U��v�����y.
4 See generally: MAy� J���� R.; DALy� ����. ‘G����� C������������� ��v���������� R�����.’ 
In: ALAM� S������; BHUIyAn� J���� H������; CH�WDHURy� ����q M.R.; ��CH�RA� ����� 
J. Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law. R��������� 2012; MAy� 
J���� R.; DALy� ����.  ‘V���������� F���������� ��v���������� R����� W��������.’ Ore. 
Rev. Intl. L. v. 11� �. 365�440� 2010; MAy� J���� R.; DALy� ����. ‘n�� D�������� �� ����� 
R������ ��v���������� R����� ��� H���� R������ S�x F����� �f C��������������y �������� 
��v���������� R����� W��������.’ IUCN Academy of Environmental Law E-Journal. v. 
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that make effective outcomes more likely, but not assured – in environmental 
constitutionalism for advancing positive environmental outcomes considering 
energy, governance and sustainability.
Good practices in environmental constitutionalism can serve as a useful 
construct when considering the relationship between sustainability, energy and 
governance. Accordingly, Section A examines ten practices that are consequential 
for effectuating environmental constitutionalism and positive environmental 
outcomes. Section B goes on to explain how the Robinson Township decision out of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the United States provides a recent example 
of how good practices can have a positive impact on environmental outcomes.
ten Good PractIces In envIronmental constItutIonalIsm
The following section lists ten ‘good practices’ in environmental constitutionalism. 
However, we do not wish to imply that adherence to any particular approach 
or combination of practices will guarantee a particular outcome, including the 
effective deployment of environmental constitutionalism. In fact, any attempt 
to identify good practices must involve a tincture of magical thinking, and is 
certain to invite, at least, healthy criticism. The rest approximates a sort of social 
scientific method involving hypothesis, experiment, and reflection. The same 
caveat applies to our assignations – we merely suggest that bearing in mind 
these ten correlative but non-causative considerations will increase the likelihood 
of positive environmental outcomes.
sItuate envIronmental constItutIonalIsm In amenable 
systems, I.e. those amenable to socIal, economIc and 
cultural rIGhts, and those wIth cIvIl law tradItIons
The first good practice in environmental constitutionalism is finding a suitable 
fit, i.e. a constitutional and governance structure that is amenable to environmental 
MAy� J���� R. Principles of Constitutional Environmental Law. ABA P���������� ���
v���������� L�� I��������� 2011; MAy� J���� R. ‘C����������� F���������� ��v���������� 
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constitutionalism. Countries that demonstrate a constitutional commitment to 
social, economic, and cultural rights (SECs) appear to be those that are more 
amenable to environmental constitutionalism. SECs are designed to protect 
human well-being and quality of life, aiming to foster minimum standards of, or 
access to economic and social well-being. They include the rights to work, to form 
or join a trade union, and to go on strike, and the guarantee of  social security, 
child protection, food and housing, healthcare, and education. Because rights to 
a quality sustainable environment, whether land or water, have social, economic 
and cultural implications, they are more likely to be found in constitutions that 
recognize other SEC rights.5
A recent sweeping report from the Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social 
Rights (TIESR) dataset supports the observation that national acceptance of SECs 
correlates with good practices in environmental constitutionalism. The TIESR 
study measured the presence, absence, and justiciability of seventeen SECs6 
that include a right to a healthy environment among constitutions worldwide.7 
Importantly, the TIESR study shows a strong correlation between SECs in general 
and environmental rights in particular. It shows that countries with multiple SECs are 
more apt to enshrine a right to a quality environment. The TIESR study concludes 
that 73 countries (or about 53.7 percent of the survey field) of those countries 
with SECs also constitutionally enshrine a right to a quality environment.8
Moreover, Gellers concludes that external regulatory influences tend to 
have the most profound effect on a country’s predilection toward recognizing 
social and economic rights, including environmental rights.9 Indeed, the 
external normative pressures may be culturally, historically, and geographically 
contingent: the common values shared by many Latin American countries – many 
5 JUnG� C������y; R�S�V�AR� �v��. �������� ��� S����� R����� A����� �� �� R������� 
��� L���� ����������� A P���� ����y A���y��� �f ��� �I�SR D������. 30 Nordic Jrnl. Hum. 
Rights� 2012� �. 372; 376.
6 ��� �I�SR ������ ��f��� �� ����� �� “�������� ��� S����� R������” �� “�SR�.”
7 ��� �I�SR ������� �� �v������� ������ �� �����//���.�����.���.
8 JUnG� C������y; R�S�V�AR� �v��. �������� ��� S����� R����� A����� �� �� R������� 
��� L���� ����������� A P���� ����y A���y��� �f ��� �I�SR D������. 30 Nordic Jrnl. Hum. 
Rights� 2012� �. 381.
9 G�LL�RS� J�����. Survival of the Greenest: A S���������� A���y��� �f C������������� ��v��
��������� R������ 2012. Av������� ��� <�����//������.����.���/���3/������. �f�?��������_
��=2103960>
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of which are committed to a deep form of environmental constitutionalism – may 
be distinct from those shared by middle eastern countries, or Asian countries, 
thus accounting for regional differences in approaches to constitutionalism 
and environmentalism.
Moreover, environmental constitutionalism tends to enjoy more success in 
constitutional systems grounded in civil law traditions than in those that operate 
under other legal traditions. This is significant, considering that governance 
structures worldwide predominantly reflect civil law traditions.10 Common law 
systems are less likely to embody environmental constitutionalism, although 
more likely than Muslim or customary law-based systems, which are least likely 
to reflect environmental constitutionalism.11
clearly artIculate a PosItIve IndIvIdual or collectIve 
rIGht, such as “everyone has an enforceable rIGht to a 
qualIty envIronment.”
Textually, the simplest good practice in environmental constitutionalism is to 
guarantee individuated (or collective) environmental rights clearly and directly, 
such as by recognizing a ‘that everyone’ has the right to an ‘adequate,’ ‘clean,’ 
‘healthy,’ ‘productive,’ ‘harmonious,’ or ‘sustainable’ environment.
Where the constitution is not explicit on the question of environmental 
protection, the courts in some countries – particularly India and its neighbors12 – 
have inferred this protection from other constitutional rights, such as the right to 
life, health, or dignity.13 While these innovations are welcome from the standpoint 
10 ��� �I�SR ����y ������������� ������������� �� f������� C�v�� L��� �=112 C����� L��� 
�=35 C�������y L��� �=57 M����  L��� �=34. JUnG� C������y; R�S�V�AR� �v��. ����
����� ��� S����� R����� A����� �� �� R������� ��� L���� ����������� A P���� ����y A���y��� 
�f ��� �I�SR D������. 30 Nordic Jrnl. Hum. Rights� 2012� �. 388.
11 JUnG� C������y; R�S�V�AR� �v��. �������� ��� S����� R����� A����� �� �� R������� 
��� L���� ����������� A P���� ����y A���y��� �f ��� �I�SR D������. 30 Nordic Jrnl. Hum. 
Rights� 2012� �. 394.
12 JUnG� C������y; R�S�V�AR� �v��. �������� ��� S����� R����� A����� �� �� R������� 
��� L���� ����������� A P���� ����y A���y��� �f ��� �I�SR D������. 30 Nordic Jrnl. Hum. 
Rights� 2012� �. 167–70. See generally� SRIPA�I� V�j�y�����. Human Rights in India – 
Fifty Years after Independence. 26 D��v. J. I��‘� L. & P��‘y� 1997� �. 93�100.
13 BRUCH� C���; C�k�R� W���; VAnARSDAL�� C����. ‘C������������� ��v���������� L��� G�v�
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of environmental protection, they may not be as durable as judicial vindication of 
clear constitutional mandates: in environmental constitutionalism, as elsewhere, 
the more grounded in constitutional text the judicial consecration is, the less 
susceptible it will be to criticism, repudiation, or reversal.
A related good practice is to provide constitutional history, which can assist with 
interpretive questions. Environmental provisions are often enacted with little if any 
guidance on threshold questions. Except for some exceptions, there is little evidence 
of the intent of those drafting these provisions that would provide guidance to their 
interpreters.14 A good practice, which is seen far more often as a breach, is to include 
some explanation or interpretive guidance about the environmental provisions in 
the constitutional drafting history. Where this is done, – as it was in the adoption of 
the provision for the rights of nature in Ecuador – it can be of great usefulness and 
persuasive authority for a court seeking to interpret the constitutional text.15
make ProvIsIons self-executInG by addInG them to “bIll” 
or “declaratIon” of rIGhts, PlacInG them on Par wIth 
tradItIonal fIrst-order rIGhts
The most effective substantive environmental rights are those that are self-
executing. Self-executing provisions may be enforced without the need for 
interceding legislative action. Indeed, the whole point of entrenching a right is 
to ensure that the value remains protected even if (and especially when) it is not 
supported by a political majority.
Self-execution of environmental rights can be exhibited either structurally 
or syntactically. Substantive environmental rights provisions that appear 
(���������� �������������� �������������� �� ��������� I����� P�������� B���������� n����� 
C�������� �������� C���� R���� ��� ���� ��������� �� Af����).
14 ��� ����� ����� �� ��� ���������� ������ �f ������ ���� ����������� ��� �x�������� �� �� q����� 
�� ������ f��� ��� ������ �f A������ A������ P�������� �f ��� C���������� A������y� �� ���
�������� ���� f���y ��� ������� �f ������������������� ��� ������ �f ������. See WHEELER 
c. Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja Juicio� n�. 11121�2011�
0010 (‘W������’). Av������� �� <�����//�����.���.�������.���/��v����������/2011/07/12/
���������������������������������������������������������/>.
15 W������� q������ ��� ����� �f ��� �������������� ���f���� ���������� A����� �� ��� � ����
����� �f ��� ������ �f ������.
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structurally in a constitution alongside first-generation constitutional rights 
are those most likely to be self-executing.16 Some nations place substantive 
environmental rights among other first-generation civil and political rights by 
designating them as an express “Right,” or “Major,” “Human,” “Fundamental,” 
“Basic,” or “Guaranteed” right.
The constitutions of the majority of nations that have adopted substantive 
environmental rights seem to classify them as self-executing rights. Such 
structural placement increases the likelihood that such provisions will be self-
executing and enforceable.
Structural placement or syntax can also suggest that some substantive 
environmental rights provisions may not be self-executing and enforceable. 
Moreover, placing substantive environmental rights within preambles, among 
general provisions, or in statements of general policy may suggest something 
other than a self-executing right. On the other hand, when the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court finally took the constitutional environmental right of that right 
seriously, it noted that the placement of the provision within the Declaration of 
Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution gives the rights protected therein the 
same degree of protection as any other individual right: “The right delineated in 
the first clause of Section 27 presumptively is on par with, and enforceable to the 
same extent as, any other right reserved to the people in Article I. See PA. CONST. 
art. I, § 25 (“everything” in Article I is excepted from government’s general powers 
and is to remain inviolate).”17
Anything the constitution drafters can do to reinforce the importance, if not 
the primacy, of constitutional rights will promote their efficacy. Some constitutions 
allow the government to elevate environmental values over others. Some allow the 
government to restrict private property rights in favor of environmental policies, 
for example, that of Mongolia, which includes the wording: “The State shall have 
the right to … confiscate the land if it is used in a manner adverse to the health of 
the population, the interests of environmental protection and national security”. 
Chile’s constitution even contains a ‘trump’ card over all other rights in favor of 
16 See H�y����� supra ���� 3� �� 93–128 (�x������� ���������� �f j������� ��f�������� �f f���
�������� ��v���������� ������); B��������ff� supra ���� 35� �� 627–28 (f�������� �������)).
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the environment: “The law can establish specific restrictions on the exercise of 
certain rights or freedoms in order to protect the environment.”
alIGn envIronmental constItutIonalIsm
Substantive environmental rights provisions can be made even stronger 
when they are supported by allied substantive rights, including rights to water. 
Another good practice relating to textual instantiation of environmental values 
is that the more detailed the provision, the better. Many constitutions contain 
elaborate articulations of the rights, values, processes, and justifications for 
environmental protections. South Africa’s environmental provision (from 
1996) embraces both an individual right and a set of directive principles 
aimed at preventing pollution, promoting conservation, and securing 
sustainable development.  Argentina’s 1994 constitution protects the 
interests of present and future generations, and requires that the government 
repair environmental damage, use natural resources “rational[ly],”preserve 
Argentina’s natural and cultural heritage and biological diversity, and require 
environmental information and education.18 Likewise, France’s constitution 
requires environmental education and training (“Education and training on 
the environment shall contribute to the exercise of the rights and obligations 
defined by this Charter”).
Some environmental provisions specifically address certain types of activities 
that may be especially harmful to the local environment. For example, several 
countries prohibit the disposal of nuclear or hazardous waste or substances that 
are imported from another country, including Niger (“The transit, importation, 
storage, landfill, [and] dumping on the national territory of foreign pollutants or 
toxic wastes, as well as any agreement relating [to it] constitute a crime against 
the Nation, punishable by the law”).
Some constitutions identify governmental responsibilities toward specific 
objects of the environment, including the climate. The Dominican Republic’s 
18 ARG�n�InA. Argentina Constitution. 1994� A��. 42.
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constitution, for example, provides that: “The formulation and execution, through 
the law, of a plan of territorial ordering that assures the efficient and sustainable 
use of the natural resources or the Nation, in accordance with the need of adaption 
to climate change, is [a] priority of the State.”
The constitutions of other countries expressly restrain or restrict energy-
related activities that could adversely affect the environment, including that of 
Ecuador (“The State shall promote, in the public and private sectors, the use of 
environmentally clean technologies and nonpolluting and low-impact alternative 
sources of energy. Energy sovereignty shall not be achieved to the detriment of 
food sovereignty nor shall it affect the right to water”).
Addressing rights to water is another common good practice. Indeed, about 
30 constitutions provide for rights to water as a human or environmental 
right, including at least one dozen countries that instantiate a human right 
to a fair distribution of clean, safe, or potable water.19 For example, South 
Africa’s constitution makes a strong commitment to acknowledging water as a 
fundamental human right by asserting an enforceable individual right to access 
to drinking water.20
Ecuador’s protection for the rights of nature21 is another example of the 
alliance between substantive environmental rights and other constitutional 
guarantees whose combined effect is to strengthen the hands of the courts when 
they attempt to vindicate environmental rights. The Ecuadorian provision further 
confirms that this right is not merely hortatory in that it empowers each “person, 
community, people, or nationality”22 to exercise public authority to enforce the 
right, according to normal constitutional processes.23
19 ����� ���� B���v�� (A��. 16(I))� C������� (A��. 366)� ��� D��������� R������� �f C���� (A��. 
48)� ������� (A��. 12)� �������� (A��. 90(1))� G����� (A��. 216(4))� ��� M����v�� (A��. 23)� 
P����� (A���. 110 ��� 118)� S�������� (A��. 215)� S���������� (A��. 76)� U����� (A���. 
XIV(�) ��� XXI)� U�����y (A��. 47)� V�������� (A���. 127 ��� 304)� ��� Z����� (A��. 
112(�)). See B�y�� supra ���� 4� �� 85.
20 S���� Af���� C����.� ��. 2� ���. 27 (1)(�)� ‘�v��y��� ��� ��� ����� �� ��v� ������ ��— (�) 
sufficient food and water…’
21 C����������� P������� �� �� R�������� ��� �������� ����� II� ��. 7� ���. 71 ��� ����. 72–74.
22 C����������� P������� �� �� R�������� ��� �������� ����� II� ��. 7� ���. 71.
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recoGnIze emerGInG areas of envIronmental 
constItutIonalIsm IncludInG sustaInabIlIty, PublIc trust, 
clImate, and bIocentrIsm
Another good practice is to reflect emerging areas in environmental 
constitutionalism, including sustainability, rights of nature, public trust, and 
climate change.
dePloy sustaInabIlIty
Environmental sustainability is an amorphous concept that stands for the 
proposition that present generations should use resources in order to preserve 
opportunities for future generations. Nearly twenty countries expressly recognize a 
constitutional goal of ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable development’, although most 
of these are in sections of the constitutions, or written in language that indicates 
that they are not amenable to judicial enforcement. For example, Switzerland’s 
constitution contains a specific section entitled “Sustainable Development,” which 
provides that “The Confederation and the Cantons shall endeavor to achieve a 
balanced and sustainable relationship between nature and its capacity to renew 
itself and the demands placed on it by the population.”
Sustainability recognizes responsibilities owed to those who follow. The 
constitutions of about a dozen countries give at least a passing nod to ‘future 
generations.’ For example, Papua New Guinea’s constitution requires the state 
to hold environmental resources “in trust for future generations” and “for the 
benefit of future generations.”
The strongest embodiment of environmental sustainability would seem to 
stem from those constitutions that promote sustainable development for the 
purpose of protecting the interests of future generations. The constitutions of 
about a dozen countries contain this sort of hybrid pronouncement. For example, 
Mozambique’s constitution requires that the state, “[w]ith a view to guaranteeing 
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the right to the environment within the framework of sustainable development 
… shall adopt policies aimed at … guaranteeing the rational utilisation of natural 
resources and the safeguarding of their capacity to regenerate, ecological stability 
and the rights of future generations.”
The constitutions of some countries require that specific resources be 
developed with future generations in mind. For example, the Dominican 
Republic provides that “nonrenewable natural resources can only be explored 
and exploited by individuals under sustainable environmental criteria …” and 
provides for the protection of the environment “for the benefit of the present 
and future generations..”
PublIc trust
Environmental constitutionalism often reflects notions of public trust. The 
constitutions of about half a dozen countries reference holding or protecting 
resources for the ‘public trust’ or some variation of that terminology. These tend to 
impose a trust responsibility upon policy makers, rulers, or citizens to hold resources 
in trust for current or future generations. Some specify trust responsibilities as a 
general governing norm. For example, the Ugandan Constitution provides that 
“the Government or a local government, as determined by Parliament by law, 
shall hold in trust for the people and protect, natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest 
reserves, game reserves, national parks and any land to be reserved for ecological 
and touristic purposes for the common good of all citizens.” Reflecting traditional 
views of sovereignty, some constitutions invest public trust in a supreme leader. 
For example, Ghana’s constitution provides that “All public lands in Ghana shall 
be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for, the people of Ghana,” 
and “every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, rivers, 
streams, water courses throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and any 
area covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is the property of the 
Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust 
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Some constitutional provisions hold citizens accountable to hold resources in 
trust for future generations. For example, Tanzania’s constitution provides “that 
all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the country in trust for 
their descendants.”
clImate chanGe
Shortcomings in international and domestic responses to climate change 
create opportunities for tactical deployment of environmental constitutionalism. 
Thus far, however, very few countries have seen fit to address climate change 
constitutionally. The Dominican Republic’s constitution is explicit on the point, 
with a provision under “The Organization of the Territory” that provides for a 
“plan of territorial ordering that assures the efficient and sustainable use of the 
natural resources of the Nation, in accordance with the need for adaptation to 
climate change …”
Environmental constitutionalism might play an important, albeit limited role in local 
approaches to climate change. Constitutions can, for one thing, direct governments 
to enact and implement policies to address the effects of climate change in ways 
not accomplished through existing international and national laws. And once these 
polices have been absorbed into the constitutional texts, the courts can force action 
by enforcing these provisions, even if this is accomplished gradually.
bIocentrIc rIGhts
Environmental constitutionalism advancing the right of nature is emergent and 
insistent, but still uncommon. The constitutionalization of the rights of nature is 
part of a growing global movement, highlighting the importance of the natural 
environment for its own sake and as a whole, rather than as an aggregation of 
resources to be harnessed by humans for various purposes.24
24 DALy� ����. “��� ���������� �x������� ��� F���� �v�� V�������
����� �f C������������� R����� �f n�����.” RECIEL 21 (1) 2012. Av����
���� ��� <�����//����f.��v�2.��������������.���/���������/���_����������_ 
�x������_���_F����_�v��_V�����������_�f_C�������������_R�����_�f_n�����.��f>.; Global 
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Environmental constitutionalism addressing nature appears as either 
governmental duties or substantive rights of nature. First, the constitutions of 
some countries require all branches of government to protect nature. Germany’s 
constitution, for instance, requires that the government protect “the natural 
bases of life and the animals within the framework of the constitutional order 
by legislation, and in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial 
power.”
Secondly, biocentric environmental constitutionalism – recognizing the 
right of nature – has been pushed most emphatically by two countries in South 
America. In 2008, Ecuador amended its constitution to recognize the right of 
nature, providing that: “Nature, or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and 
created, has the right to integral respect for her existence, her maintenance, and 
for the regeneration of her vital cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary 
processes.”25 Bolivia also has a framework law recognizing the rights of nature,26 
and discussions of constitutional reforms to recognize them have taken place in 
Turkey.27 Moreover, rights of nature have recently found traction at the super-
subnational level, including in various municipalities in the United States.28
Even without explicit protection for the rights of nature, courts might be 
encouraged to interpret constitutional environmental provisions as protecting 
natural resources, the natural environment, or the biodiversity within it. For 
instance, in vindicating the Chilean constitution’s right to a healthy environment, 
the Chilean Constitutional Court held that the right extended to cases involving 
environmental degradation per se, regardless of its effect on humans. This would 
Alliance for the Rights of Nature. �������f������.���; Community Environmental Legal De-
fense Fund. �����//���.����f.���/��������f�������.
25 C���������ó� P��í���� �� �� R��ú����� ��� �������. ����� II� ��. ��v��� ����. 71–74. F�� �� ���
�������� ��v��� �f ��� j������� ���������v����� �� �������� ��v���������� ������ �� �������� 
��� R����� P������ k��f�. “R�v����� �f F������; A ��������� ���y�� ������ ���������� 
������ � ���� ��v���������� j������� ������� C��v���. B�� ��� �� �� ��� f��?�” The New 
Yorker� J�����y 9� 2012.
26 See VIDAL� J���. Bolivia enshrines natural world’s rights with equal status for 
Mother Earth. Av������ ��� <�����//���.��������.��.��/��v��������/2011/���/10/���
��v����������������������������������>.
27 See GL�BAL ALLIAnC� F�R �H� RIGH�S �F nA�UR�. Turkey calling for ecological con-
stitution. Av������ ��� <�����//����������f������.���/��������f������������/�����y��������
�����������������/>.
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include cases requiring the clean-up of beaches of Chañaral, Chile, for instance, 
where copper tailing wastes had been deposited for 50 years, destroying the 
marine life.29 Where this is the norm, the case would center on whether the 
environment itself is healthy, not on whether the environmental degradation 
induced any harm to human beings. This is especially important with respect 
to water-related rights, where ecological concerns may be inconsistent with the 
human right to adequate water for personal and commercial uses.
scaffold addItIonal statutory and reGulatory means to 
ImPlement constItutIonal PreroGatIves
The impact of constitutional provisions, whether elaborate or sparse, can also 
be enhanced by extra-constitutional scaffolding. In the Philippines and Argentina, 
elaborate statutory schemes promote and facilitate vindication of environmental 
constitutional rights. In the Philippines, the Supreme Court has developed a set of 
“Rules Of Procedure For Environmental Cases” that encourage the vindication 
of constitutional and other environmental rights in extraordinary ways.30
Importantly for environmental rights, the Philippine Rules provide for 
consideration of cases brought on behalf of nature, known as the “writ of 
Kalikasan.” Such a writ can be pursued on behalf “of persons whose constitutional 
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened” by a public 
official or private entity, “involving environmental damage of such magnitude 
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities 
or provinces.” 31
Provisions making environmental information available, as well as requirements 
relating to standing, proof of injury, and the allocation of fees and costs can also 
promote or deter invocation of constitutional environmental rights provisions. 
These issues can be defined constitutionally or statutorily, and can be articulated 
29 Pedro Flores y Otros v. Corporacion Del Cobre, Codelco, Division Salvador. R��. 12.753 FS. 
641 (S������ C���� �f C����� 1988).
30 F�� � ���������� �f ��� ��������� f�� ��v���������� ������� ��������� �� ��������� ��������� 
�������� ������� ������ ������������� (“SLAPP” �����)� ��� R��� P����� [C���]
31 (R��� 7� �. 1).
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explicitly and exclusively for the enforcement of constitutional rights or without 
any explicit reference to environmental rights at all. Here too, the more work 
is done by the text, the less need for judicial interpretation and interpolation. 
All of this assumes what is perhaps the most significant determinant of the 
efficacy of constitutional environmental provisions: that they exist within a 
legal and political framework in which an independent and adequately funded 
judiciary has the authority, legitimacy, and expertise necessary to meaningfully 
implement not only environmental rights, but other constitutional guarantees 
as well. Constitutions in countries where rule of law can be assumed to be 
entrenched and respected are unlikely to be effectively implemented steadily 
over time. And environmental rights in particular require persistent application 
in order for the benefits to be realized.
lIberalIze access to the judIcIal vIndIcatIon by PermIttInG 
oPen standInG, sPecIal Procedural rules and fee-shIftInG 
for PIl
Before a court reaches the merits of a constitutional claim, it will often consider 
the preliminary question of standing: whether the party that brought the suit has 
the right to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Most constitutional traditions have 
a standing doctrine, although they vary widely from country to country. Some 
constitutional systems limit who can challenge government action to certain 
members of the government, or to an ombudsman, while others encourage 
anyone to seek judicial protection. Although sometimes seen as a fringe question, 
standing rules can have a dramatic effect on a nation’s legal culture: where standing 
rules are broad and inviting, more people are encouraged to bring more cases to 
enforce more laws, not only for their own private benefit but for the public good. 
Conversely, where courts restrict access to judicial fora, compliance with existing 
laws, as well as the progressive realization of constitutional promises, may be 
seen more as a matter of political discretion than of constitutional obligation.
Environmental cases, in particular, challenge conventional standing practices. 
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has traditionally been limited to those who can assert well-recognized claims, 
including claims for harms recognized by common law (such as violations of 
property rights) or interests specifically identified in statutory provisions. In either 
case, the claims are personal, and standing rules tend to reflect the principle 
that only individuals who are personally and particularly injured may assert their 
interests against defendants and lay claim to scarce judicial resources.
Environmental harms, however, tend to affect groups of people generally and 
similarly. They may affect a whole community or culture or, in the case of climate 
change, all of humanity. Even where an individual can claim a particular harm – 
for example, where a toxic leak proves carcinogenic – it is most likely that the 
plaintiff will not be the only person affected; a whole community may be affected 
by a greater incidence of cancer; indeed, the plaintiff is more likely to be able to 
show causation in cases where the defendant’s wrongful actions have caused 
widespread, rather than just personal injury. In even more difficult cases, the 
claim is based on the health not of an individual but of the environment in the 
abstract, and may raise questions about environmental aesthetics or the health 
of a particular animal population that do not directly affect most people at all.
Consequently, the good practice is to relax or defray standing requirements 
to vindicate constitutional environmental rights. Some constitutions make the 
decision for the court, clearly delineating who may sue and who may not, either 
for all claims or specifically in environmental cases. In Spain, constitutional 
environmental rights are protected, but they are enforceable only when an 
ombudsman initiates litigation. This contrasts markedly with the rest of the Spanish-
speaking world, which tends to be receptive to constitutional environmental 
claims. The constitutions of Argentina and Ecuador, for instance, invite any citizen 
to vindicate such rights, the latter even allowing claims on behalf of nature itself.32 
The Constitution of South Africa, too, adopts an open attitude toward standing, 
which is buttressed by legislation that reinforces the right of any person to 
approach the court to assert his or her own interest, the interest of another, or 
the public interest. The statutory authority to sue extends to suits on behalf of 
32 A��. C����. ��. I� ��. II� ���. 41–43; C���������ó� P��í���� �� �� R��ú����� ��� �������. ����� 
II� ��. ��v��� ���. 71–74.
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In Latin America, constitutional and statutory provisions have encouraged 
courts to expand standing for environmental cases even to those who cannot 
show a direct and individual injury; in India and its neighbors, courts have had to 
infer broad standing from legal and cultural norms. But in both of these regions, 
as well as in some other countries around the world, the commitment to opening 
the courthouse doors to environmental claimants is well-established.
Even where the positive law is not as clear, some courts have opened their 
doors to environmental activists, often seeing these non-traditional stakeholders 
not only as litigants, but as partners in an ongoing campaign in which the courts 
are equally invested.
develoP jurIsPrudence In 
envIronmental constItutIonalIsm
The final good practice delineated here is to develop the jurisprudence 
of environmental constitutionalism. Courts asked to apply constitutional 
environmental rights provisions face numerous difficult choices and have 
significant discretion in terms of interpretation, vindication, and remediation. 
There are no generally accepted standards for identifying or vindicating these 
interests as rights, partly because, in straddling every familiar category of rights, 
environmental constitutionalism defies easy classification:34
Environmental rights partake of human rights as well as non-human rights, 
protecting such values as biodiversity and nature itself. As a human right, the 
33 See PL�SSIS� L���� J. k����; A�é� ��. ‘S��� B���f �����v������ �� F�f���� y���� �f ��v�����
������ R����� J������������ �� S���� Af����.’ Journal of Court Innovations. v. 3� 2010� 
�. 157� 163�164. (���������� S���� Af���� C����. ���. 20 ��� ��� n������� ��v���������� 
M��������� A�� 107 �f 1998 (n�MA)� ���. 32).
34 See HAyWARD� �� . Constitutional Environmental Rights� 25–58. �xf��� U��v�����y 
P����� 2005. (������ � ���� f�� � ����� ����� �� �� “���q���� ��v��������”); HILL� B���y 
�.; W�LFS�n� S��v�; �ARG� n�������. “H���� R����� ��� ��� ��v��������� A Sy������ ��� 
S��� P�����������.” Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. v. 16� 2004� �. 361 “[W]���� ����� ������� �� 
�� � ������� ����� f�v����� � ����� ����� �� � ����� ��� ������y ��v��������—��v��v��� 
��� ��������� �f ������� ��������� ������� ��� ��v���������� f������—������������� ������� 
nations, and states have yet to articulate a sufficiently clear legal test or framework so as 
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environment can be protected through civil and political rights of participation 
and access to information, but it can also be protected as a social, economic, 
and even cultural right. Environmental rights can be collective or individual, 
and they can apply to the majority or to a discrete, insular, and politically 
powerless minority. They can be treated as immediately enforceable, or realized 
progressively over time, according to a legislative plan and limited by the 
availability of fiscal resources. They can be implicit or explicit, procedural or 
substantive, and they can be amenable to judicial review or immune to it. They 
can be positive or negative or both (sometimes in the same case). They can be 
remedied injunctively or through compensation or declaration, for violations 
occurring in the past, as well as for harms as yet unknown and to people as yet 
unborn. In some ways, remedying environmental harms is long overdue, and 
yet, the primary beneficiaries of environmental rights are future generations. 
Environmental rights define the relationship between people and the world 
we live in, though invariably in broad and amorphous terms, without clear foci 
or boundaries.
So how do courts give content to the concept of environmental rights without 
allowing them to swallow up every other right? One approach, which borrows from 
the discourse at the international level, is to limit the reach of environmental rights 
to already accepted human rights.35 Environmental constitutionalism has pushed 
the conventional limits of this approach in two directions. Even where constitutions 
do not specifically enumerate particular rights, courts have expanded the scope 
of interests that constitute violations of familiar human rights by recognizing, for 
instance, that environmental degradation can constitute a violation of privacy and 
family life, or that esthetic and recreational environmental interests are essential 
to enjoying a dignified existence.
35 A����� supra ���� 27� �� 10 (“�x������ ������� �f �������� ��� ������������� ��� ������� 
� �������������� �������� �� ��v���������� ���������� ��� ��������� ��� ���������� 
������� ����� ������ ��� ��v���������� ����������. ����� ���������� ��� ���v� �� � 
v����� f��������� ���� ����� �� ����� � ��� �y���� �� ��������� ��� ������� ������������� 
��v���������� ����� ������.”); ����v�� supra ���� 39� �� 667 (“A� �������� ����� �� � 
������y ��v�������� f�v��� ��� ���������� �f ������ ������. ���� �� ������� ���� � ����� �� 
v����� �� ��������������� ��� ����������� ���������� ��v���������� ���������� f�� ���� 
������ ������ ��� ��������� �� ��������� �������.”).
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A slightly less anthropocentric option is to explicitly recognize environmental 
rights as a human right, so that environmental harms do not have to fit neatly into 
the other human rights boxes.36 This view reflects an international environmental 
law approach, and has been incorporated into constitutions throughout the world. 
This also ensures that environmental values are given at least as much weight as 
other constitutional values, and perhaps more than some37 and more than non-
constitutional values such as development or some property interests.
An even less anthropocentric approach involves a class of rights somewhere 
between human rights and rights of nature that permit humans to commence 
constitutional environmental claims to protect nature or wildlife. A final approach 
would entirely reject anthropocentrism and recognize instead the rights of nature.
There is no “best” practice here; the beauty of constitutionalism is that it takes a 
global problem and allows each nation to define for itself the particular balance of 
competing values that will produce the greatest benefit for each particular society. 
One country may be most concerned with protecting biodiversity, while the principal 
focus may be to ensure adequate water resources for everyone, while a third may 
be most concerned with promoting participatory environmental decision-making. 
Environmental constitutionalism permits each country to address its own priorities. 
The “good practice” here is that each country’s constitutional environmental 
framework should reflect those priorities in a robust and enduring way.
However, good practices require that as many aspects of litigation be 
made express and comprehensive in advance as possible, particularly where 
environmental rights confound ordinary expectations and assumptions generally 
applicable outside of environmental constitutionalism. For instance, while the 
beneficiaries of other constitutional rights are the putative litigants – think, for 
36 SH�L��n, Dinah. “Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights 
H�v� B��� R���������?” Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y. v. 35� 2006� �. 129� 163 [�������f��� 
S������ II] (“M����v��� ����������� � ����� �� ��v�������� ����� ��������� �������� �f 
������ ���������� ��� ���������� �������� ���������v� ����� ��� ��������y ��������� ����� 
����� ������ ��� ������� �f ��� ��������������� f����.”); B��������ff� supra ���� 70� �� 
646 (“A ���� ��������������� �������������� �f �������������� ��v���������� ������ ����� �� 
���� ������ ������ ��������� �f �������� ��� ������������� �ff���� �� ������� ��� ������� �f 
nature for us and for the benefit of our children.”).
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instance, of those who would claim the right to free speech, or to protection 
of property – the putative beneficiaries of environmental constitutionalism 
are often not clear. For example, under a directive principle of state policy, the 
Indian Constitution requires that the state “endeavour to protect and improve 
the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.”38 This 
protection seems to be as much for the benefit of the citizens as for the wildlife 
and even the forests themselves. But if the wildlife is not safeguarded, who can 
sue? This is not only a question of standing, but of the nature of the right and 
purpose of judicial intervention into the policy-making authority of the state. 
Is the court empowered to protect the flora and fauna, or only to protect the 
people of the nation? Is a government constitutionally obliged to legislate for the 
benefit of the rivers, or may it limit its portfolio to helping the citizens directly? 
Can a constitution protect non-human interests?
These difficult questions of public policy may, in some instances, even require 
recalibrating the boundaries between the public and private spheres. While some 
governments are held responsible for the environmental degradation caused by 
their licensees, some corporations are required to bear the burden of actions 
for the public good, such as environmental clean-up. In fact, environmental 
litigation can often reverse normal expectations relating to the roles of public 
and private parties. Whereas traditional constitutional rights litigation pits the 
private individual against the public authority, environmental litigation often pits 
members of the public against a private entity (thus invoking the principle of 
the horizontal application of constitutional rights and obligations). Moreover, in 
many of these cases, private individuals are asserting public rights, whereas the 
government is facilitating private gain.39 This does not only mean that the courts 
should consider standing questions expansively; rather, environmental litigation 
is increasingly forcing courts to adjust long-held views on the proper allocation 
of public and private powers. It is therefore good practice to explicitly clarify 
the putative beneficiary of the right, whether in the constitution itself or in early 
decisions from the interpreting court.
38 I���� C����. ���. 48A. 1976. F���y������� A��������.
39 See, e.g.� id.; M����� ������ supra ���� 1� �� 173 (��v��v��� ��v�������������� �� ��� ���
������); k��v������ & B������ supra ���� 5� �� 79 (��f������ �� H�����y ������� �� ���� �ff 
f������ �� ���v��� ���������).
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Indeed, it seems evident that no constitution will address every issue, or even 
every major issue, that is likely to arise. Interpreting courts, therefore, have a 
significant and ongoing responsibility to decide these important questions and 
to use their opinions to explicate them; this would typically include not only 
explaining the interpretive choices, but setting out the constitutional values and 
principles that underlie the decision.
Install comPlImentary natIonal and subnatIonal 
envIronmental constItutIonalIsm
Complimentary national and subnational constitutional enactments are 
another good practice in environmental constitutionalism. Led by states in the 
Americas in general, and Brazil in particular, subnational governments around the 
world have seen fit to constitutionalize substantive and procedural environmental 
rights, environmental duties, and sustainable development for present and future 
generations, often with much more specificity and enforceability than is provided 
in the national constitutions.
Subnational environmental constitutionalism can complement national efforts 
in several ways. First, subnational constitutions can reflect local environmental 
concerns that can be ignored or underserved by the national constitution, 
even when those concerns may address global challenges. Second, subnational 
constitutions can fill gaps often left open in national constitutions. Remarkable 
examples of this are found in Brazil, whose state constitutions delineate 
extensive governmental functions in the service of substantive environmental 
rights, including promoting biodiversity and sustainability, protecting species 
and water quality, advancing conservation and environmental education, and 
enforcing environmental requirements. This type of complementarity reinforces 
the tenet that environmental protection is a shared obligation between the 
central and peripheral governments, and is relevant to both the national 
identity and local control. Germany provides another example of rich state 
constitutional environmental protection that supports federal environmental 
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exists in the United States is more developed at the state level than at the 
federal level.
bundle wIth constItutIonal recoGnItIon of rIGhts to 
InformatIon, PartIcIPatIon and access to justIce
Constitutional provisions that protect procedural rights, particularly including 
rights to information on environmental matters, rights to participate in 
environmental decision making, and access to environmental justice, can also 
materially advance the vindication of substantive environmental rights.
The constitutions of about three dozen countries specifically recognize 
procedural rights in environmental matters, primarily to advance a human right 
to a quality environment. Such rights to information, participation, and access to 
justice in environmental matters are a modern constitutional innovation. These 
sorts of provisions appear to serve both human and environmental interests, and 
can advance democratic values.40
Most of these constitutional procedural environmental rights provisions seem 
to be designed to help implement substantive environmental rights. For example, 
Ukraine’s constitution from 2004 creates an individual right to an environment 
that is “safe for life and health” and further provides for damages when the right 
has been violated. It further provides for the right of access to and dissemination 
of information about the environment as well as the quality of food and consumer 
goods.41 Where such provisions expressly denote environmental concerns, they are 
more likely to be invoked by litigants and recognized by courts in environmental 
40 See �nZIVU� W������. ‘I������������ ��v���������� L��� ��� P�����’� H������ ��� D������� 
��v���������� G�v������� �� D�v������� C��������.’ Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. v. 21� 2006� 
�. 672 (‘I������������ ����� ������ ��� ��� �������� ������������� ���v��� f�� ���������� 
������ ���� ��� ������������ �� ��� ���������� �f ����� ������ ��� ��� ��v��������. ����� 
������ ������� f������ �f ������������ f������ �f ��f��������� ������ ������������� �� �����
���� ������ ���������� ��� ������ �� j������ ��� j������� ��v���.’); C������ supra ���� 
31� �� 74 (‘��� ���� f�� � f���������� ����� ����� �� ��v���������� ���������� �� �� ���� 
��������� ������� f�� ������ �� ��v������� ��������� ��� �������� ���� ���� ���� ��v��
��������� �������.’); BAnDI� Gy���. ‘��� R���� �� ��v�������� �� �����y ��� P�������� ��� 
H�������� �x��������.’ Conn. J. Int’l. L. v. 8� 1993� �. 450–65 (���������� ��� H�������� 
C�����������’� ������ ������������� ���v������); H�y����� supra ���� 3� �� 200–03 (��������
��� ���������� ��v���������� ������ �� Af���� ��� ���������).
41 U������ C����. (2004)� C�. II� A��. 50.
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cases, partly because the language itself suggests that they are designed to 
complement substantive environmental rights. But they can still be indispensable 
to the vindication of constitutional environmental right, even where they are of 
general applicability.
robInson townshIP v. commonwealth of PennsylvanIa: 
Good PractIces In PractIce
The Robinson Township opinion from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reflects 
good practices in constitutional environmental opinion-writing at the juncture 
of sustainability, governance and sustainability.
In Robinson Township, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave life to the state’s 
constitutional environmental rights provision which had been adopted more 
than 30 years previously. It struck as unconstitutional major parts of “Act 13” – 
a state oil and gas law designed to promote “horizontal hydraulic fracturing,” 
or “hydrofracking.” The Environmental Rights Amendment affords rights and 
imposes public trust duties that are commensurate with other constitutional 
prerogatives: “It is not a historical accident that the Pennsylvania Constitution 
now places citizens’ environmental rights on par with their political rights.”42 
Act 27 was enacted based on “the mischief to be remedied and the object 
to be attained,” namely, to address environmental degradation in the state 
by promoting individual environmental rights and requiring governmental 
authorities to hold natural resources in public trust.43 Horizontal hydrofracking, 
on the other hand, is a relatively new engineering technique that can be used 
to gain access to the natural oil and gas embedded in deep shale “plays” a mile 
or more under the surface of the earth. The Pennsylvania legislature enacted 
Act 13 in 2012 to promote the development of the state’s extensive “Marcellus 
Shale” play.
42 R������� �������� �� ��. v. C����������� �f P����y�v����� P�. S��. C�.� n�. J�127A�D�
2012 (������� D��. 19� 2013) (��������y �������)� �v������� ��� �����//�����.���.�������.
edu/envirolawcenter/files/2013/12/J-127A-D-2012oajc1.pdf.
43 R������� �������� �� ��. v. C����������� �f P����y�v����� P�. S��. C�.� n�. J�127A�D�
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A plurality of the court determined that Act 13 contravenes the recommendation, 
in Section 27, that the state hold natural resources “in the public trust”: “we agree 
with the citizens that as an exercise of the police power, [Act 13 is] incompatible 
with the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources.” It observed: “As the citizens illustrate, development of the natural gas 
industry in the Commonwealth unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and 
undeniably detrimental, impact on the quality … of Pennsylvania’s environment, 
which are part of the public trust.”44
The opinion of the plurality in Robinson Township reinforces environmental 
constitutionalism insofar as it represents an authentic attempt to engage the text 
of the Environmental Rights Amendment. First, it noted that Article 27 – much 
like many provisions that provide such rights – vests two rights in the people of 
the state. The first is a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of 
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. The second 
is “a limitation on the state’s power to act contrary to this right.” Importantly, it 
held that these rights are equal in status and enforceability to any other rights 
included in the state constitution, including property rights.
Secondly, it enforces the “public trust” provisions, that is, the obligations of 
the state to hold resources in the public trust for all people. Because the state is 
the trustee of these resources, it has a fiduciary duty to “conserve and maintain” 
them: “The plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain implicates a duty 
to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public 
natural resources.”
The plurality in Robinson Township also noted that the Environmental Rights 
Amendment serves both present and future generations. Echoing sentiments from 
the majority opinion in Minors Oposa, it observed: “By any responsible account, 
the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will produce a detrimental 
effect on the environment, on the people, their children, and future generations, 
and potentially on the public purse, perhaps rivaling the environmental effects of 
44 R������� �������� �� ��. v. C����������� �f P����y�v����� P�. S��. C�.� n�. J�127A�D�
2012 (������� D��. 19� 2013) (��������y �������)� �v������� ��� �����//�����.���.�������.
edu/envirolawcenter/files/2013/12/J-127A-D-2012oajc1.pdf.
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coal extraction.” In so doing, the opinion of the plurality advances, in particular, 
the purpose of constitutional-enshrinement of environmental rights and public 
trust duties in the first place – to promote environmental protection and advance 
individual rights to a quality environment.
In some ways, Robinson Township is a more modern embodiment of good 
practices in environmental jurisprudence reflected in the in Minors Oposa, in which 
the Philippine Supreme Court laid the foundation for recognizing the rights of 
future generations to bring environmental claims:
Petitioners [who are] minors assert that they represent their generation 
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that 
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the 
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in 
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept 
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced 
and healthful ecology is concerned.
But the court went further and elucidated the meaning of the constitutional 
mandate to protect the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and 
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, 
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s 
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas 
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, 
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present 
as well as future generations.
With this expansive and fundamental conception of nature, the court was able 
to justify its holding that children and future generations had a legitimate and 
cognizable legal claim.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to 
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced 
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of 
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the 
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right 
for the generations to come.45
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Robinson Township clearly reflects the good practices outlined in the prior 
section. The underlying provisions were adopted in a governance structure that 
already recognized social, economic and cultural rights. The underlying rights were 
explicit and self-enforcing, and were placed within an appropriate constitutional 
constellation. The rights were also coupled with evolving notions of environmental 
constitutionalism concerning sustainability, future generations, public trust, and 
energy use, and afforded participatory rights in a scaffolded legislative and 
regulatory setting with complimentary municipal and local considerations.
conclusIon
The experience of the courts, in trying to make sense of constitutional 
environmental rights and give them serious consideration, reveals a lesson which, 
when learned, may significantly enrich the praxis of constitutional law generally. 
At heart, the adoption of good practices in the constitutional incorporation of 
environmental rights, protections, and procedures is multi-faceted, and serves as 
a proxy for social agreements with present and future generations.
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